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Resumen:  
Es conocido que la intervención sindical tiene un efecto positivo sobre la reducción de 
los accidentes de trabajo. Sin embargo, no existe evidencia comparable sobre su efecto 
en las patologías psicosomáticas. La presente investigación estudia el impacto de la 
representación de los trabajadores en materia de riesgos psicosociales, tanto en términos 
agregados para el conjunto de la UE como de forma comparada entre los distintos 
sistemas de relaciones laborales. A tal efecto, se analizan los microdatos de una encuesta 
a 31.991 centros de trabajo europeos (ESENER-2), mediante diversos modelos de 
regresión que permitieron identificar cómo la presencia de representantes garantiza 
estándares más elevados de gestión y la correspondiente activación cultural, mientras 
que los de absentismo laboral solo se reducen con la participación directa y activa de los 
trabajadores. Por su parte, el análisis de correspondencias múltiples permite constatar 
cómo los sistemas institucionalizados del área centroeuropea y mediterránea presentan 
más dificultades para involucrar a los trabajadores que los escandinavos o anglosajones 
caracterizados por mayores niveles de autorregulación.  
Palabras clave: Recursos de poder sindical, estudio comparado, riesgos psicosociales, 
cultura participativa, espejismo institucional. 
Abstract: 
 
It is known that union intervention has a positive effect on the reduction of occupational 
accidents. However, there is no comparable evidence on its effect on psychosomatic 
pathologies. This research studies the impact of workers' representation on psychosocial 
risks, both in aggregate terms for the whole of the EU and in a comparative manner 
between the different systems of labor relations. To this end, the microdata of a survey of 
31,991 European work centers (ESENER-2) are analyzed by means of various regression 
models that allowed the identification of how the presence of representatives guarantees 
higher standards of management and the corresponding cultural activation, while those 
of absenteeism from work are only reduced with the direct and active participation of the 
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workers. On the other hand, the analysis of multiple correspondences allows us to see 
how the institutionalized systems of the Central European and Mediterranean area 
present more difficulties in involving workers than the Scandinavian or Anglo-Saxon 
systems, which are characterized by higher levels of self-regulation. 
Keywords: Union power resources, comparative study, psychosocial risks, participatory 
culture, institutional mirage. 
1. Introduction: Effects of union intervention on occupational health 
Throughout history, the union movement has played a relevant role in improving 
working conditions and fighting against pathologies (physical or psychological) that 
threatened the health of workers, as demonstrated by the strikes against ceruse or white 
phosphorus (Rainhorn, 2010; Voguel, 2016). To date, we have strong empirical evidence 
on the positive impact of union intervention on occupational safety and health (Johnstone, 
et al., 2005; Walters and Nichols, 2006; Walters and Nichols, 2007). Following the 
analytical typology of Walters, et al. (2005), econometric studies that analyze the effects 
of indirect worker participation, through their representatives, on occupational health 
harms can be divided between those that measure its direct impact, on the one hand, and 
those that analyze its indirect impact, on the other. In this sense, various investigations 
have found a statistically significant relationship between the presence of general (unitary 
or union) and specialized occupational health representation bodies (prevention delegates 
or safety and health committees) in workplaces, with the reduction of occupational 
accidents (Nichols, et al., 2007; Reilly, et al., 1995; Robinson and Smallman, 2013) and 
occupational diseases (Robinson and Smallman, 2006). In reference to the indirect impact 
of union action on occupational health, it is also known how in workplaces where general 
and specialized representation operates, preventive management standards are increased 
(indirect impact A) (Coutrot, 2009; Ollé, et al. 2015; Weil 1992) and a participatory 
culture is activated to the extent that the company's commitment to preventive 
management and the promotion of direct participation by workers are increasing (indirect 
impact B) (Biggins et al. 1991; Shaw and Turner, 2003; Warren-Langford et al. 1993). 
This is a double indirect impact because the companies that best integrate the three phases 
of the preventive management cycle (elaboration of prevention plans, risk evaluation, 
design and planning of action measures) and involve the workers in the design and 
implementation of this management system (direct active participation), present fewer 
work accidents than companies with lower management standards and an authoritarian 
management that simply informs the workers (direct passive participation) of the risks 
(Autenrieth, et al. 2016; Robinson and Smallman, 2013), as discussed in the analytical 
framework (Figure 1) of this research. 
Despite the positive effect of associative power on standards of labor welfare, the 
truth is that there are also studies that have found how unionized workplaces have the 
highest rates of accidents (Fenn and Ashby, 2004; Hillage, et al., 2000; Litwin, 2000), 
which has shifted the focus of research to the study of the determinants that drive or 
weaken the degree of real participation of workers' representatives (Menendez, et al. 
2009; Walters and Wadsworth, 2014, 2020). Such studies have identified at the 
organizational level as the degree of leadership and business commitment, the depth 
(passive or active) of direct worker participation, the size of the company, the sector or 
the production power (genuine capacities) of the workers in the company, the levels of 
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unionization of general and specialized representation, the economic situation of the 
company or the system of integration of prevention (own or external means), influence 
the levels of participation and effectiveness of collective representation. To these, it is 
necessary to add macro-contextual determinants related to the labor relations systems, to 
the extent that the existing legislation (which promotes participation in the company), the 
institutional power of the unions in the collective bargaining or social agreement and the 
strength of the labor inspection, affect, likewise, the levels of effectiveness of the 
associative power in the workplaces. 
Figure 1: Impact of representation systems on occupational safety and health 
systems 
 
This is a consolidated line of research, but nevertheless, there are still some 
questions or issues to be resolved. Firstly, the analyses carried out have focused on the 
union impact on the management of traditional industrial safety and hygiene risks linked 
to work accidents and occupational diseases, but they do not investigate new and 
emerging risks of psychosocial origin. However, at present, the combined effect of the 
policies of management of the economic crisis by the bodies of European governance 
oriented towards the flexibilization of the markets (Crouch, 2014) together with other 
processes of transformation of the productive processes such as the digitalization of the 
economy (EU-OSHA, 2018) or the recent pandemic outbreak of Covid-19 (Sherman, et 
al. 2020), have led to an increase in job and economic insecurity, and with it, exposure to 
psychosocial risk factors (work without limits, dislocation of working time, etc.) causing 
the emergence of psychosomatic pathologies such as anguish, anxiety (techno anxiety), 
stress (techno stress, techno phobia, techno addiction) or depression. In fact, it is 
estimated that the main cause of work absenteeism in the European Union are mental 
pathologies (Leka and Jain, 2017). It is likely that union action will also have a positive 
effect on psychosocial risks, but there is no empirical evidence comparable to that 






















the benefits of direct worker participation on the psychosocial environment through 
human resource policies focused on the economic root of participation (Findlay, et al. 
2013; Knudsen, et al., 2011; Llorens, et al., 2019), but nevertheless, they forget about its 
political root and the problems derived from the asymmetry of power in labor relations. 
Therefore, this research attempts to provide empirical evidence about the impact (direct 
and indirect) of workers' representatives on the management of psychosocial risks, with 
the aim of answering the following research questions: 
 Q1: What is the relationship between the presence of collective representation 
systems in European workplaces and the levels of psychosocial risk management? 
(indirect impact A). 
 Q2: Are workers' representatives able to change the behavior of managers in 
management systems and involve workers in the design and implementation of 
measures to eliminate psychosocial risks? (indirect impact B). 
 Q3: What impact does the presence of representation systems have on the levels 
of absenteeism in the workplace? Is their presence sufficient or is it necessary to 
activate a preventive culture? (Direct impact). 
Historically, two different approaches have operated in the analysis and 
management of occupational safety and health problems. The first has its origin in the 
American Safety First movement which proposed the necessary activation of a preventive 
culture within the company as an essential element to reduce occupational accidents. The 
second derives from the so-called "calendar of death" of the Pittsburgh survey (Swuste, 
et al., 2010) which defends as a key factor for reducing accidents, state intervention in the 
regulation of environmental conditions (production speed, protection of facilities and 
machines, etc.). These approaches are associated with different forms of regulation of 
occupational safety and health. On the one hand, the Anglo-Saxon systems, especially in 
the United Kingdom through the influential Robens Report, took up the legacy of the 
Safety First movement and opted for the self-regulation of preventive management 
systems with general national standards that encouraged the activation of a preventive 
culture within the company, and on the other hand, those coming from the central 
European area that started from the principle of worker protection by the public authority 
(Camas, 2005: 36). Both perspectives are integrated in the current Directive 89/391/EEC 
(hereinafter the Framework Directive), which combines the regulation of a general 
business security debt and participatory rights with the development of supra-business 
regulatory standards (Narocki, al., 2011). Despite the homogenization effected by the 
Framework Directive, there are still regulatory differences between the countries of the 
European Union due to the historical configuration of their labor relations models. 
While it is true that the economic crisis of the last decade has led to a growing 
internal diversification among the countries that make up the same system of labor 
relations, from a longue durée perspective, each model still maintains essential historical 
elements that allow for telescopic analysis of their common characteristics (Gumbrell-
McCormick and Hyman, 2013: 6; Lehndorff, et al. 2018 :15). Thus, while the Anglo-
Saxon and Scandinavian systems maintain the voluntary and self-regulated character of 
their labor relations (albeit with different state models and governance systems) with a 
strong union presence in the workplaces and participation systems, in general terms, from 
the bottom up; Central European and Mediterranean countries present a high level of state 
intervention in labor regulation and their union power is articulated with the 
institutionalization of labor relations through their organizational leaderships, with a 
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greater top-down orientation in participatory processes (Beneyto, 2018; Rigby and 
García-Calavia, 2018). This differentiation is important, since most of the previous 
studies we have cited come from Anglo-Saxon countries, especially the United Kingdom 
(see, among others, Fenn and Ashby, 2004; Hillage, et al., 2000; Litwin, 2000 Nichols, et 
al., 2007; Reilly, et al., 1995; Robinson and Smallman, 2013) and there is no comparable 
scientific evidence in other models of labor relations, so we pose the following research 
question: 
 Q4: Which strategy will be more efficient for the management of psychosocial 
risks, that of the systems that promote self-regulation of the management of the 
preventive system, or that of those who base their intervention on institutional 
power? 
 
2. Research methodology 
2.1. Sample population 
In order to answer our research questions, we have developed a transversal study 
based on the microdata from the Second European Survey of Enterprises on New and 
Emerging Risks (ESENER-2), prepared by the European Agency for Safety and Health 
at Work (EU-OSHA, 2017). ESENER-2 records the management systems for the 
prevention of psychosocial risks in 49,320 work centers with five or more employees 
from all sectors of economic activity except private households (NACE T) and 
extraterritorial organisations [(NACE U) from 36 countries (28 European member states, 
as well as six candidate countries and two countries of the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA)]. In order to carry out the statistical analyses, 19 countries have been 
selected corresponding to the different models of labor relations in Western Europe, so 
that the final sample used to develop this research was 31,991 work centers. Specifically, 
four countries were selected from the Anglo-Saxon area (United Kingdom, Ireland, Malta 
and Cyprus), five from the continental model of labor relations (Germany, Austria, 
Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg), another four from the Scandinavian system 
(Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway) and five from the Mediterranean area (Spain, 
France, Portugal, Italy and Greece). 
2.2. Dependent Variables 
In order to measure the impact of the representation systems on the levels of 
management of psychosocial risks (1st research question - indirect impact A), different 
operations have been carried out for the construction of an indicator. First, nine questions 
have been selected from ESENER-2 corresponding to each phase of the prevention 
management process (see table 1), each with two possible response alternatives (0=No / 
1=Yes). Secondly, the nine questions were added up, resulting in a measurement scale 
ranging from 0 (no indicator managed) to 9 (all indicators managed). Through the 
calculation of Cronbach's Alpha coefficient (α= .789) the adequacy of the measurement 
scale was confirmed (George and MAllery, 2003) and its validity for confirmatory studies 
(Huth et al., 2006). Finally, the indicator was recoded into three levels of preventive 
management: 1= from 0 to 3 managed indicators defined as low level; 2= from 4 to 7 
(medium level); and 3= from 8 to 9 (high level). 
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In relation to the indicators of preventive culture corresponding to the second 
research question (indirect impact B), the following are proposed: a) leadership or 
commitment of the management, measured on the basis of question Q162 regarding the 
degree of business involvement in the management system (1=usually / 2=occasionally / 
3=almost never); b) passive participation of the workers, measured through question 
Q256_5 referring to whether the workers had been informed of the results of the risk 
assessment (1=Yes / 2=No) and, finally, active participation, measured through question 
Q305, which asked about the degree of involvement of the workers in the design and 
implementation of prevention measures (1=Yes / 2=No). 
The third of the research questions (direct impact) was measured through question 
Q450, which divided into five the levels of absenteeism (very high / quite high / within 
the average / quite low / very low). Due to the few cases with very high (416 cases) or 
high (1453) levels of absenteeism, the indicator was recoded into three response 
alternatives (1= Quite low or low / 2= Within the mean / 3= Very high or high). It is worth 
mentioning that, in the present investigation, it was decided to use as an indicator for the 
evaluation of labor health the level of absenteeism to the detriment of the official records 
of labor accidents and professional illnesses, due to psychosomatic pathologies (anxiety, 
depression, stress, sleep problems, etc.). ) produced by exposure to psychosocial risks, 
from a legal point of view, are systematically excluded from the official registers in most 
countries of the European Union, in application of Commission Recommendation 
2003/670/EC of September 19, 2003, concerning the European list of occupational 
diseases (which does not contemplate psychosomatic pathologies as a disease) so that "in 
very few countries are stress-related diseases included in the official lists of occupational 
diseases" (Leka et al. 2015: 4).   
2.3. Independent Variables 
The presence of worker representation, both general (unitary and union) and 
specialized in occupational safety and health (prevention delegates and occupational 
safety and health committees), in the workplaces was measured through question Q166. 
It is worth mentioning that both forms of representation have different relationships with 
each other, depending on the country, from parallel to overlapping and/or complementary 
channels, with an aggregate coverage of around 58% of the total number of workers (see 
Fulton, 2018). It is worth mentioning that, due to the fact that this is a comparative 
statistical study, the systems of interest representation must be simplified in order to be 
able to analyse complex realities, but it is nevertheless interesting to delve into certain 
differentiating aspects. On the one hand, in countries with self-regulated voluntary 
industrial relations systems (Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian), there are no electoral 
hearing mechanisms developed by legislation, which means that the main associative 
resource for workers is trade union membership and shop stewards. On the other hand, 
the countries of the Mediterranean and continental area have institutionalised industrial 
relations systems where state intervention is high, regulating electoral hearing 
mechanisms, which results in a dual channel configuration of interest representation 
(trade union and unitary). However, there is a wide range of casuistry in the institutional 
configuration. While in countries such as Spain and Portugal, unitary representation 
prevails over union representation, in France and Italy a dual channel of interest 
representation is configured, with union representation prevailing (see Beneyto, 2018; 
Payá and Beneyto, 2019). In addition, there are models in which the right to freedom of 
association is mandatory and in a positive sense, and in other models there is the duality 
of freedom of association as a fundamental right, but in both positive and negative senses, 
LAN HARREMANAK – REVISTA DE RELACIONES LABORALES, nº 45 / Edición In Press    7
 
i.e. free choice, affiliation or non-affiliation if the worker considers it appropriate. This is 
crucial as it will influence the role of workers' representative organisations and the degree 
of trust placed in them. These actors are part of the integrative model of the preventive 
culture that each and every company requires. The mechanisms for action in the 
prevention of occupational risks, especially those associated with psychosocial factors, 
share both collective and individual intervention actions. 
2.4. Covariates for the Adjustment of Statistical Models 
As we saw in the introductory section, there are a number of determining factors 
that can affect the effectiveness of indirect worker participation, both on the levels of 
preventive management and the activation of the culture of participation and the levels of 
absenteeism. Therefore, in order to avoid spurious relationships in the statistical models 
carried out, we use as control variables both internal determinants of the organization 
itself and factors related to the economic and social macro context of a supra-business 
nature. Among the internal factors, three indicators have been selected: a) the size of the 
work center; b) the sector of activity and c) the economic situation of the company 
(Q451). While to capture the effect of the macro context, two indicators are used: a) the 
country to which each work center belongs as a generic indicator of the tradition of labor 
relations and b) the strength of the labor inspection (Q165) as an institution with specific 
functions of monitoring and control of compliance with preventive regulations. Table 1 


























































Plans, programmes and procedures 
• Q300.- Does your workplace have an action plan to prevent 
work-related stress?  
• Q301.- Do you have a procedure for dealing with possible cases of 
harassment or bullying?  
• Q302.- Do you have a procedure for dealing with possible cases of 










Q252: Which of the following aspects are usually included in these workplace 
risk assessments on a regular basis? 
• Q252_5)- Relations between the worker and his supervisor.  
• Q252_6)-Organizational aspects such as working hours, breaks 
or shifts. 
 
Planning of preventive action measures 
In the last 3 years, has your workplace implemented any of the following 
measures to prevent psychosocial risks? 
 • Q301_1) Reorganization of work in order to reduce work demands
 
  and pressure. 
 
 • Q301_2) Confidential advice for workers.
 
 • Q303_3) Implementation of a dispute resolution procedure.
 









culture • Q162.- In your workplace, how often do senior management deal
 
  with issues related to the prevention of occupational hazards?
  
Direct passive participation 
Who has received the results of the workplace risk assessment?  
• Q. 256_5) The workers themselves. 
 
Direct active participation  
• Q305- Did workers participate in the design and adoption 
of measures to prevent psychosocial risks? 
 
Absenteeism  
• Q450 How would you describe the level of absenteeism in your 



























1. Yes  
2. No 
 
Level of absenteeism: 
1. Quite low or very low 
2. Within the average 
3. High or very high 
 
System of Q166. Which of the following forms of worker representation are available in Unitary Representation 
 
representation your workplace? 1. Yes 
 
 • Q166_1) Staff delegate, works council to staff meeting 2. No 
 
 • Q166_2) Shop steward Trade Union Representation 
 
 • Q166_3) Prevention delegate 1. Yes 
 
 • Q166_4) Committee on Safety and Health at Work 2. No 
 
   Prevention delegate 
 
   1. Yes 
 
  2. No 
 
   
Committee on Safety and 
Health at Work 
 
  1. Yes
 
Adjustment Micro Contextual 




variables • Size of the work centre   
 
• Sector of activity  
• Q451. How would you describe your workplace's current economic situation - is it very good, fairly 
good, neither good nor bad, fairly bad or very bad? 
 
Contextual macro  
• Country  
• Q165.- Has your workplace received any visits from the Labour Inspectorate in the last 3 years 




2.5. Statistical analysis  
To measure at an aggregate level the relationships between the presence of the 
different forms of interest representation in the workplaces with the levels of preventive 
management (Q1-Indirect Impact A), the activation of a participatory culture (Q2- 
indirect impact B) and the levels of absenteeism (Q-3- direct impact), both binary logistic 
regressions (for the dummy dependent variables referring to passive and active 
participation) and multinomial regressions (when the dependent variable had three 
categories) were carried out, establishing as a reference category the lowest levels for 
each of the five dependent variables (low level of preventive management; management 
is almost never involved in management; the absence of passive participation; the absence 
of active participation; and, very low or quite low level of absenteeism), calculating the 
adjusted odds ratios (aOR) for the sociodemographic covariates described in section 2. 
4., with their corresponding 95% confidence intervals (CI95%). However, in order to 
measure the direct impact (Q3) in the regression model, the indicators of preventive 
management and culture were also included to know whether the mere presence of 
representatives in the workplaces is sufficient or, on the contrary, the active participation 
of the workers in the management of psychosocial risks is necessary.  
Finally, the fourth research question (Q4) is studied in a disaggregated way, related 
to the role of the different models of labor relations on the management systems for the 
prevention of psychosocial risks. To this end, a Multiple Correspondence Analysis 
(MCA) was carried out, which made it possible to classify the countries on a positioning 
map according to the levels of preventive management, participatory culture and levels 
of absenteeism. As a complement to the MCA, a classification analysis was carried out 
using the Ward's hierarchical bottom-up method, in order to group the countries into a 
number of groups or segments more precisely than the MCA. Through the classification 
analysis, greater precision was obtained in the formation of clusters of countries with 
homogeneous systems. Finally, it should be noted that all statistical calculations were 
done through the SPSS version 26 statistical software. 
3. Results 
3.1. Indirect impact 
The results obtained (Figure 2) show the existence of a positive relationship 
between the levels of preventive management and the presence of workers' 
representatives in the workplaces (indirect impact A), which, in turn, is increased at the 
highest levels of psychosocial risk management. Specifically, work centers with the 
presence of unitary representatives are 1.94 more likely to have the most developed 
management systems compared to centers without representation (aOR=1.94; 
95%CI:1.71-2.21), while the impact of the presence of union delegates has been found to 
be slightly lower (aOR=1.44; 95%CI:1.26-1.63). However, the highest differences have 
been found in the specialized representation systems for preventive matters, insofar as 
those workplaces that have joint occupational safety and health committees are 2.63 more 






Figure 2: Multinomial regressions between the presence of representation systems 
and preventive management levels 
 
Note: The reference category for the dependent variable was low level of management and for the 
independent variables was no representation. Adjusted odds ratios (aOR) were calculated for all covariates 
described in Section 2.24 
 
In reference to the activation of a preventive culture in the workplace (indirect 
impact B), the results found (Figure 3) show how the presence of representation systems 
is also related to a greater commitment by management in the management of 
psychosocial risks and to the active participation of workers in the design of preventive 
action measures. It has been found that in workplaces with the presence of personnel 
delegates or works councils, there is a 1.31 greater probability that managers will become 
routinely involved in occupational safety and health issues (aOR=1.31; 95%CI: 1.01-
1.70). However, this relationship has had a low level of significance and the presence of 
union delegates is not predictive. However, the figures specialized in occupational safety 
and health have a high indirect impact to the extent that the presence of prevention 
delegates doubles the probability of activating the company's commitment (aOR=2.06; 
95%CI:1.61-2.64), and even triples it in the case of joint occupational safety and health 








Figure 3: Regressions between the presence of representation systems and the levels 
of business commitment and worker participation 
 
Note: The reference categories for the dependent variable were the low level of corporate commitment and 
the absence of passive and active involvement. The independent variables were the absence of 
representation. Adjusted odds ratios (aOR) were calculated for all covariates described in Section 2.24 
 
In addition, the results obtained have shown how specialized representation in 
occupational safety and health has a positive and significant impact on the levels of direct 
participation of workers, both in its passive version and in its more active facet. 
Specifically, it has been shown that in those workplaces with the presence of prevention 
delegates, there is a 1.34 greater chance that the workers will be informed about the risks 
and the measures to be adopted to reduce exposure to psychosocial risks (aOR=1.34; 
95%CI:1.24-1.44). Also on this point, the strongest associations have been found in the 
presence of occupational safety and health committees, to the extent that they not only 
guarantee a higher level of passive participation by workers (aOR=1.51; 95%CI:1.39-
1.63), but also are able to involve them in the design and implementation of preventive 
action measures to reduce or eliminate such risks (aOR=1.28; 95%CI:1.16-1.41). 
3.2. Direct impact 
With reference to the results obtained on the direct impact of the different 
representation systems (table 2), it has been found, on the one hand, that the presence of 
unitary and specialized occupational health representatives in the workplaces is not 
predictive of the levels of absenteeism, but, on the other hand, the presence of union 
delegates is related to a 1. 99 more likely to be at the highest levels of absenteeism 
(aOR=1.99; 95%CI:1.56-2.53) in a very significant way (p-value=0.000), which shows, 
a priori, a negative impact of union action.  In spite of this, the presence of representation 
in the work centers has a positive impact in an indirect manner due to two issues. Firstly, 
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the highest levels of preventive management place the companies in the intermediate 
levels of absenteeism (aOR=1.32;95%CI:1.03-1.64) but they have not become predictive 
in the highest levels of absenteeism. Secondly, it has been observed how the only 
indicator that guarantees not to be at the highest levels of absenteeism is the active 
participation of workers in the design and implementation of action measures to prevent 
psychosocial risks (aOR=0.74;95%CI%:0.59-0.93). 
Table 2. Multinomial logistic regression on absenteeism levels
 
Note: A The reference category was the low or very low level of absenteeism. B Adjusted odds ratios (aOR) 
for all the independent variables shown in the table itself and the covariates described in section 2.24., and 
their corresponding confidence intervals (95%CI). c Reference category of the independent variables. 
3.3. Comparative study of industrial relations systems 
In order to answer the fourth research question (Q4), aimed at finding out the 
effectiveness of the different models of labor relations in the prevention of psychosocial 
risks, we conducted a MCA that has allowed us to reduce the information of the 21 
categories of the 9 active variables (see indicators table 1) in two main dimensions that 
explain 51% of the inertia (variance). Thus, the selected active variables have a high 
predictive capacity of the models of labor relations in occupational safety and health to 
 Intermediate level of 
absenteeismA 
Very high or high level of 
absenteeismA 
 aOR (95%CI)B P-Valor aOR(CI)B P-Valor 
Presence of unitary 
representation systems 
    
Unitary Representation    
Without personnel 
delegate 
1C  1C  
With personnel delegate 1.01 (0.88-1.16) 0.910 1.06 (0.93-1.36) 0.633 
Trade Union Representation     
No union representative 1C  1C  
Without a trade union 
delegate 
1.46 (1.28-1.67) 0.000 1.99 (1.56-2.53) 0.000 
Specialized representation     
Without prevention 
delegate 
1C  1C  
With prevention delegate 1.03 (0.88-1.20) 0.742 0.83 (0.64-1.07) 0.149 
Occupational Safety and Health 
Committee 
    
Without committee 1C  1C  
With committee 1.01 (0.88-1.16) 0.890 1.20 (0.64-1.07) 0.149 
Preventive management     
Management of psychosocial risks     
Low Level 1C  1C  
Medium Level 1.31 (1.04-1.65) 0.024 1.10 (0.84-1.45) 0.479 
High Level 1.32 (1.03-1.64) 0.029 1.16 (0.85-1.59) 0.365 
Preventive culture     
Management's commitment     
Rarely committed 1C  1C  
Occasionally it commits 1.14 (0.72-1.54) 0.499 0.92 (0.48-1.76) 0.800 
It usually commits 1.05 (0.78-1.68) 0.801 1.12 (0.60-2.11) 0.722 
Passive worker participation     
Without participation 1C  1C  
With participation 0.84 (0.75-0.94) 0.003 0.83 (0.67-1.02) 0.070 
Active employee participation     
Without participation 1C  1C  




the extent that a small number of variables explain more than half of the differences 
between the models. Of the two main dimensions that make up the general model, the 
first dimension explains 35.9% of the cases (inertia); while the second resulting 
dimension has obtained an inertia that explains 15.1% of the cases. The calculations of 
the discriminant measures (Figure 4) can show which of the two dimensions corresponds 
to the indicators of the prevention management system. On the one hand, it is observed 
that both the levels of general and specialized representativeness in labor health and the 
indicator of management of psychosocial risks are predictors of the first dimension. On 
the other hand, the indicators of preventive culture and absenteeism are located in the 
second dimension, which coincides with the statistical analysis carried out in table 2, in 
the average in which only active participation is inversely related to absenteeism levels 
and, therefore, both variables share the second of the dimensions. 
Figure 4: Discriminant measures of active model variables 
 
The resulting model of the MCA is represented in figure 5 and, as can be seen in 
the positioning map, the first dimension places on the left those countries with a lower 
rate of general and specialized representation (blue line), as well as those with less 
preventive management (purple line); while the countries with greater representation and 
management are located on the extreme right. With respect to the second dimension, the 
countries with the lowest level of preventive culture are located in the upper left quadrant 
(green line) and those with the highest level are located in the lower right quadrant. On 
the other hand, the levels of labor absenteeism behave inversely to the indicators of 
preventive culture, with the lowest being located in the lower left quadrant (red line) and 
the highest in the upper right quadrant. To be more precise in determining the clusters in 
which to locate the countries with homogeneous characteristics, a hierarchical, bottom-





Figure 5: Segments of industrial relations systems in multiple correspondence 
analysis and factor space 
 
As can be seen in figure 5, in the first of the clusters (C1) there are mainly the 
countries of the Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon area (and Italy as a post-volunteer 
country) that, despite notorious differences in the models of governance, present as a 
common element the voluntary nature of their labor relations.  These countries have 
historically advocated self-regulation mechanisms (centralized in the Scandinavian area 
and decentralized in the Anglo-Saxon area) for working conditions and, therefore, in the 
field of occupational safety and health they defend the postulates of the Robens Report, 
to which we have already referred. As can be seen in Figure 5, this model has a high 
associative power, both union and specialized in occupational health, which guarantees 
higher standards of preventive management as well as the self-regulated cultural 
activation of these management systems, with the result of a significant reduction in the 
rates of absenteeism. 
For its part, in the second of the clusters (C2) are located mainly the Central 
European countries and some of the Mediterranean area as Spain or France, characterized 
by the institutionalized model of their labor relations and certain levels of corporatism 
(medium-high in the Germanic area and low in the Mediterranean countries). As we saw 
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in the introduction, countries with high state intervention in the regulation of labor 
relations focus their strategies on strengthening institutional power, especially through 
mechanisms for the erga omnes extension of collective bargaining agreements. This 
strategy generates ambivalent results because, while it is true that, on the one hand, it 
allows the coverage of collective bargaining to be expanded, on the other hand it weakens 
the power of association (free rider effect that discourages union membership and 
participation) (Beneyto, 2018: 44), which, as shown in Figure 5, results in a moderate 
representation in occupational safety and health that, in turn, weakens the active 
participation of workers (they are in the upper quadrant) and negatively impacts 
absenteeism rates. It can be concluded, therefore, that these countries may fall into a kind 
of mirage of institutional security in which prevention becomes a technocratic 
bureaucratic document management system, oriented towards formal compliance with 
the rules (environmental protection, as seen in the introduction), which, however, does 
not guarantee the real effectiveness of the system. Therefore, it is necessary to increase 
the associative power within the company in order to involve the workers in the design 
and implementation of the preventive cycle since, as we have seen in table 2, this is the 
most relevant determinant for reducing labor absenteeism. 
The third cluster (C3) includes the countries that have seen their institutional power 
resources degraded during the economic crisis (Portugal, Greece and, to a lesser extent, 
the Czech Republic). The conditionality policies imposed by the Troika based on a 
political exchange of neoliberal intergovernmentalism, focused on providing financial aid 
and bank bailouts in exchange for the flexibilization of the labor market, forced the Greek 
and Portuguese governments to deregulate the institutional arrangements that supported 
their labor relations systems (Gago, 2016). Specifically, the general effectiveness of 
collective bargaining agreements was eliminated in the Greek case and criteria of 
representativeness were established that were difficult to meet for their extension in the 
Portuguese case (Rigby and García-Calavia, 2018). This situation could explain the low 
levels of preventive management found in both countries in the MCA (Figure 5). 
Deregulation can lead, on the one hand, to business relaxation in order to comply with 
prevention standards and, on the other hand, make it difficult for representatives to 
monitor and pressure the compliance of these management standards and the visibility of 
the damages derived from the work. In fact, these countries present low labor 
absenteeism, which can be interpreted negatively to the extent that the low associative 
power derives in low union pressure in the notification of damages (Eaton and Nocerino, 
2000: 278). Thus, when the institutionalized mechanisms of labor relations depend on 
government discretion (Schmidt on al. 2017: 2015), the changes in the political cycle can 
restrict, as has occurred in these cases, the mechanisms for the extension of agreements, 
weakening the unions that find it very difficult to resort to other resources of power that 
allow them to rebalance the structure of the negotiation (Koukiadaki et al, 2016: 80), 
which ends up activating a spiral of labor deregulation and deterioration of the systems 
of preventive management, workers' health and their capacity for representation. 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
This research has shown that the presence of workers' representatives guarantees 
higher standards of psychosocial risk management and the activation of a participatory 
culture in European workplaces, which confirms previous studies focusing on industrial 
risks (Coutrot, 2009; Ollé, et al., 2015; Shaw and Turner 2003). However, no direct 
positive impact of such intervention on workplace welfare outcomes has been found. In 
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fact, the intervention of union delegates seems to be related to higher levels of 
absenteeism. This situation is not new, since union presence has also been related to 
higher levels of accident rates (Fenn and Ashby, 2004; Hillage, et al., 2000; Litwin, 2000). 
There are various explanations that have been given for this situation: on the one hand, in 
the most dangerous workplaces there can be a "call effect" from the workers to the unions 
for their defense (Fenn and Ashby, 2004: 479; Nichols, 1997:149) and, on the other hand, 
the union presence could produce less underreporting of accidents due to their demands 
for compensation for professional contingency (Eaton and Nocerino, 2000: 278). With 
the results obtained in the present investigation we could incorporate a third hypothesis 
related to the functional diversity between the systems of general representation and those 
specialized in labor health. In this sense, the indicators that measure the indirect impact 
(of management and cultural activation) have been linked with greater intensity to the 
specialized representation systems (above all, with the joint committees of labor safety 
and health) and, therefore, could be related to a cooperative role in management. On the 
other hand, union representation linked to greater labor absenteeism could be assigned a 
confrontational role, to the extent that they fight for the visibility of labor damages. 
Rescuing the initial analytical model (figure 1), we present below the summary of the 
main findings obtained in the course of our research (figure 6). 
Figure 6: Results of trade union impact on psychosocial risk management 
 
As can be seen, the key element of the psychosocial risk management system is the 
direct and active participation of workers (which coincides with the findings of previous 
studies such as Robinson and Smallman, 2013), since it is the only indicator that has been 
linked to lower levels of absenteeism. In fact, the differences found between labor 
relations systems derive from the ability of representatives to activate the active 
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participation of workers. Thus, countries with self-regulating systems in the Scandinavian 
and Anglo-Saxon areas have a high level of both general and specialized associative 
power, which allows them to promote a culture of prevention in the workplace, resulting 
in moderate levels of absenteeism. For their part, the Central European and Mediterranean 
countries present adequate levels of preventive management because this is required by 
law, but, however, are not capable of activating a self-regulating culture within the 
company, which leads to higher levels of absenteeism. However, it seems that having a 
high institutional power does not guarantee the efficiency of the system and may lead to 
a false sense of institutional security. Therefore, we propose to strengthen the associative 
power in countries where institutional power is the main source of power, which may be 
particularly difficult, especially in Mediterranean countries, since the low market power 
of workers (high unemployment rates, temporality and rotation, segmentation of the 
business fabric into micro-SMEs, etc.) is not only linked to a probability of suffering 
occupational accidents (Benavides et al., 2006) but also erodes the associative power of 
unions (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman (2013). 
The data seems to confirm this relationship. In the first case, we can see that 
Portugal has a standardized rate of 3,563 accidents per 100,000 workers in 2017, placing 
it next to France with 3,307 and Spain with 3,057 at levels that are almost double the EU-
28 average of 1,666 (Eurostat, 2020). On the other hand, the associative resources 
available to workers' representatives in terms of prevention are comparatively weaker. 
Spain is the clearest example, since it went from recording a coverage rate of prevention 
delegates of 70% in ESENER-1 in 2009 to 51% in ESENER-2 in 2014, while Portugal 
and France recorded even lower levels (24% and 25% respectively), far from the 
European average of 58% (EU-OSHA, 2017), resulting in a spiral of erosion of preventive 
systems and the consequent increase in damage to the health of workers, without 
sufficient trade union capacity to reverse this trend. Some countries have supra-company 
networks of territorial prevention delegates (the most developed in Sweden, United 
Kingdom or Italy) that have proven to be able to penetrate the smallest companies and 
have had positive effects on the indicators of preventive management and the reduction 
of damages derived from work (Walters, et al., 2018), so that the development of this type 
of representation in the Mediterranean and Central European countries could be an 
effective alternative for the defense of workers and the promotion of occupational safety 
and health. 
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